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Introduction
The title of my lecture parodies Milton in his
search for paradise. Technology education in
its many guises in the UK has the idea of
'capability' embedded within it. Like Milton's
search, there has been a search for capability's
identity. The nature of capability has varied
over time and among different advocates.
Although capability has been central to the
debate about technology education for the last
10 years or so, we have vacillated in what we
understand by the term. However, in the final
version of the National Curriculum, we find
capability expressed as a tripartite relationship
of designing, making and knowledge. The
Programmes of Study for each key stage start
with the statement:
Pupils should be taught to develop their
design and technology capability through
combining their Designing and Making
skills ... with Knowledge and
understanding ... in order to design and
make products." (DFEIWO, 1995)
What remains unclear is just how the
'combining' takes place, an issue that has
been present in all the models of capability
that have emerged over the past 10 years.
These models started with the recognition of
the combination of process and content; for
example, that of Black and Harrison (1985)
shown in Figure I. But they also emphasised
the link between thinking and action. Black
and Harrison saw capability in terms of being
able "to perform, to originate, to get things
done, to make and stand by decisions" (Black
and Harrison, 1985, p. 6). It is the ability to
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act that is the predominant idea in capability.
The APU model similarly linked thought and
action through the model of the interaction of
mind and hand (Figure 2), and its model of
capability reflected the link of process and
knowledge, with the process being that of
design (Figure 3).
The role of using 'knowledge' has always
been present in ideas of capability, but its
relationship to the process is ill-defined, as is
how knowledge is used in action. Although
we started with a clear focus on both action
and upon the combination of knowledge and
process, we have moved the focus to process
alone, leaving the role of knowledge unclear.
Paradise lost?
I shall argue that we need to examine again
what we mean by capability and in particular
to try to locate the role of knowledge. This
argument has a number of strands. First that
we cannot continue to use models of
capability that rely on processes that exist
independent of knowledge. Second, that the
use of knowledge, particularly from science
and mathematics, is more complex than the
injunction in the National Curriculum (quoted
above) presents it. Third, we need to examine
the nature of the knowledge that is used in
technological activity, and to explore
qualitative knowledge. In presenting this
argument I shall draw upon some of the
research that my colleagues and I have
undertaken at the Open University.'
Professor Robert
McCormick
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Capability as process
The focus on processes within capability,
particularly the design process, added
important dimensions to technology
education:
(APU, 1991), to avoid treating the design
process as a series of unchanging steps to be
used in all situations, have not always been
heeded. In our own work, where we have
examined teachers' approaches to process at
Key Stage 3, we have found that the 'design
process' is treated by some teachers as an
algorithm; that is, as a series of steps that are
used invariably in all situations. It is used
ritualistically to structure pupil activity, but
plays little part in the pupils' design thinking
(McCormick, Murphy and Davidson, 1994;
McCormick and Murphy, 1994; McCormick,
Murphy and Hennessy, 1994). Teachers will
structure a series of lessons to correspond to
each of the steps in the design process (first
lesson is identifying a need, second create
several solutions, third to choose one solution
and develop it and then make and evaluate).
This not only takes away design decisions
from pupils, but also misrepresents the way
design may be carried out2 In as much as the
design process is seen as a problem solving
process, this corresponds with the findings
from problem solving studies in other
domains.
giving pupils decisions and hence control
over what they produce
allowing opportunities for creative
responses to situations
reflecting an important element of
technology in the world outside school
providing a powerful motivational tool.
For those teachers who have some personal
design experience, particularly in a
professional design capacity, this approach
offers a chance to deal innovatively with an
approach to learning. For those less
experienced, the warnings in the Non-
Statutory Guidance for the National





The coincidence of problem solving and
design processes is, however, not accepted by
all. Our interviews of teachers show various
views of the two and of their relationship




1. some saw the two as synonymous (as in
Table 1)
2. others saw a 'problem' as the starting
point for a design activity (though they
did not always ensure that pupils found it
problematic)
3. some even saw the design process as a
planning process, providing pupils with a
systematic sequence of activities to keep
them on track.
Each of these approaches is defensible, but
pupils are likely to meet all three from
teachers of design and technology during their
school career, with little explicit discussion to
aid their understanding of the nature of the
processes they are experiencing. Are they to
assume that each approach is equivalent, or
that they are just different things deserving the
same name? Will pupils be involved in any
discussion about the different approaches
teachers take?
Where the problem solving process was
important, there was little attention to what
pupils found problematic or to teaching pupils
strategies or skills in problem solving. Indeed
the pressure on teachers to ensure that all
pupils produce a successful product can
mitigate against giving attention to supporting
problem solving (McCormick and Davidson,
1996). Where design is seen as distinct, the
attention to pupil learning fares no better.
Kimbell and his colleagues concluded that,
across the key stages in England, there was
little continuity in the teaching of design and
technology (Kimbell, Stables and Green,
1996). Even where pupils at Key Stage 4 are
involved in 'simulated technology' ("how real
designers work" Kimbell et ai, 1996, p. 46),
earlier evidence (Jeffery, 1990) indicates that
the need to record it for assessment purposes
leads to similar rituals to those that we
observed at Key Stage 3. We need to replace
rather mechanical views of such processes
with those that are based on how children and
indeed real designers actually work. There
are, however, relatively few empirical studies
of either problem solving or design in the
classroom, but this situation is changing.3
Problem solving and the design process need
to be seen as forms of knowledge about how
to proceed. This procedural knowledge
operates at a number of levels (McCormick,
1997). At the lowest level are simple 'know-
how-to-do' skills that are employed to, for
example, use a solvent to adhere two styrene
sheets along their edges. At a higher level
there needs to be strategic procedural
knowledge that determines the order things
are to be done in. This knowledge includes
the processes of design and problem solving.
Knowing how to evaluate a set of design
alternatives can be learned as some form of
procedural knowledge, but knowing when to
do it requires higher-level knowledge; a more
strategic approach. This kind of procedural
Table 1
Design
Identify the need or opportunity
Create alternative design ideas
Choose one idea and make or model it
Problem solving
Define or clarify the problem
Create alternative solutions
Implement the best solution
Evaluate the solution
knowledge is complex and requires close
attention to support pupils and ensure they
can learn to solve problems and design
(Murphy and McCormick, 1997). The APU
model (Figure 3) steers us away from a simple
sequence, but still leaves a complex process of
knowing when it is appropriate to 'identify',
'investigate' etc. Just 'doing' design or
problem solving activities does not ensure
they are learned, at least not with the
relatively modest level of experience of design
and technology lessons that can be given in
the years of compulsory schooling.
In addition to the issue of understanding the
nature of problem solving and design
processes and how to support them in the
classroom, there is a more fundamental issue.
This concerns the basing of any model of
capability around a process, without paying
adequate attention to the role of knowledge
(factual and conceptual). There is substantial
research on problem solving, which has
established that, treating it as an abstract
process to be employed in any context, it is
unhelpful. The crucial finding from decades
of research is that problem solving skill is
dependent upon considerable domain
knowledge (Glaser, 1984 and 1992). Thus,
rather than it being a general skill that can be
employed with equal success in a variety of
areas, it requires expertise in the context of its
application. Models of capability that assume
problem solving or design are general
transferable skills, whatever the particular
context, do not represent how real problem
solving and design take place. Those who
solve problems rarely resort-to general
processes. Research does not support the idea
of general transfer of skills, nor does it
support the teaching of problem solving as an
abstract general-purpose process (Hennessy,
McCormick, and Murphy, 1993). Models that
see a complex interplay of processes such as
'identifying', 'investigating', 'planning' etc.,
are based on the requirement of the use of
considerable conceptual knowledge4
Although they are more realistic they hide the
complexity of the nature of this 'knowledge'
and how it is used. The role of 'knowledge'S
then, must be re-examined to find its place in
capability.
+
Figure 4: Circuits in
(a) science and (b)
technology.
Capability and knowledge
To understand the role of knowledge in
capability we have to examine some
fundamental ideas on learning, which in turn
leads to an examination of the nature of
knowledge. I will do this through first
showing how knowledge is itself context
dependent, and then by examining how
knowledge is linked to action. This of course
relates well to models of capability that stress
the importance of 'action'.
The importance of context
Researchers at the Harvard Smithsonian
Institute for Astrophysics showed graphically
how knowledge is linked to context in their
work in high school science lessons. (This
was shown in a BBC television programme
Simple Minds.) A girl, who had done some
work on simple electric circuits using standard
science lesson equipment (battery, bulb, bulb-
holder, and wires), was interviewed following
the lesson. Prior to this work in science she
was able to connect up a battery to light the
bulb using only wires. When, in the interview,
she was given the materials she had used in
the science lesson, she drew a circuit diagram
that would get full marks in a test, but, as she
connected up the circuit, she insisted that the
circuit needed the bulb-holder. Even when
pressed by the interviewer, she said the circuit
would not work without it, and was astounded
when it did. Thus, when this girl learned
about electric circuits she associated bulb-
holders as a necessary part of the circuit.
Imagine this girl, before she had that
misunderstanding corrected, going into a
technology lesson here she would be
confronted not with wires, bulbs and bulb-
holders but with ceramic resistors and Printed
Circuit Boards. What is she to make of these,
and how is she to 'transfer' the ideas from the
science lesson to the technology lesson? Not
only are the physical items different, but the
representations can be different; in science she
will see a circuit represented in an abstract
form as a circular path (albeit in the form of a
square!), and its equivalent in technology
would be quite different (Figure 4). There is
an enormous amount of research in science
education that indicates the difficulties that
children have with learning abstract science
ideas (e.g. Driver, Guesne and Tiberghien,
19855; Osborne and Freyberg, 1985). It is
unlikely therefore, that their understanding
will be robust enough for them to be able to
use that knowledge in other situations; such as
in the technology class.
Similarly issues arise with mathematical
concepts. In technology the ideas in
orthographic projection are based on
mathematical ideas such as 'parallel' and
'perpendicular' lines. Technology teachers
assume that they do not have to teach these
basic concepts. However, research in
Figure 5: Evidence from an APU study of
pupils' understanding of parallel lines.
In which of the follOWingA, B, C, 0 or E are
the lines not parallel?
56% of 11-year-olds answered this question
correctly.
In a similar test, 82% of 15 year aids were
successful.
mathematical learning indicates that pupil
understanding of what 'parallel' means may
be insecure. An APU (undated) study asked
pupils aged II and 15 years the question in
Figure 5.
The expected answer is option B but over
20% of the II-year-olds put a cross on more
than one set of lines. They seem to have been
distracted by factors such as three lines being
present or lines of unequal length or lines
angled to the edge of the page. These results
confirm the findings of an earlier study by
Kerslake (1979) with 10-year-olds, which
concluded that the children had assumed
equality of length to be a criterion for lines
being parallel and had missed the point that
the lines are always the same distance apart.
Similar results were obtained in the APU
study (undated) where pupils were asked to
complete the sentence "Two lines are parallel
to each other if..." Only 30% of 15-year-olds
gave a response similar in meaning to "the
distance between them is constant". Thus we
have a situation where pupils' mathematical
concepts are not robust even in the limited
range of contexts they encounter in
mathematical lessons; for example the
changing of the lengths or orientation of the
parallel lines. Their problems are inevitably
magnified when they encounter these in the
more embedded situations typical of design
and technology projects.
This complexity is evident when the
knowledge is to be used, as is the case in the
example of orthographic projection mentioned
earlier. We have developed our work on
problem solving in design and technology
projects to consider how the children use
mathematics in design and technology
projects (Evens and McCormick, 1997 and
1998). We have observed several teachers
teaching orthographic projection (see Figure
6). In observations of a teacher explaining
how to make an orthographic projection we
find, not surprisingly, that he focused on
procedures. Some of his words indicated this:
guidelines, all line up
drop down (the vertical lines)
project the information round
transfers the sizes.
This compares with the approach typical of
mathematics classrooms, where the focus is
on concepts (Table 2).
We have characterised this difference in terms
of the technology teacher's concern with
procedural knowledge and the mathematics
teacher's concern with conceptual knowledge.
It is a common view that knowledge that is
used (called by some 'practical knowledge') is
procedural in its nature (Sternberg and
Cravso, 1985).
Incidentally, it is also evident that one of the
reasons that the technology teacher does not
articulate concepts such as 'parallel lines' or
'perpendicular lines' is that these ideas are
incorporated into the T-squares and set-
squares, which are the tools used in this kind
of drawing (but not used in mathematics).
This is another illustration of the way
knowledge is bound in with context (in this
case the tools). These observations about the
use of knowledge become more
understandable when we consider the nature
of knowledge in relation to action.
Knowledge and action
Most of us no doubt assume that knowledge is
in the head, and that we dig it out of our
memory banks to use it for some task. There
are, however, a collection of approaches to
cognition and learning that argue that the
knowledge is integrated with activity, along
with the tools, sign systems and skills
associated with the activity. In this sense
knowledge guides action, and action guides
knowledge. A classic study of dairy workers
illustrates this inter-relationship of knowledge
and activity (Scribner, 1985). One part of the
study looked at how their various jobs
(clerical, delivery or warehouse), affected how
they thought about the dairy products,
compared for example with consumers. Most
consumers thought of the products in terms of
'kinds' (e.g. milk and cheese), whereas drivers





Table 2: Comparison of terms used by technology and maths
teachers in orthographic projection
Technology teacher Mathematics teacher
guidelines, all line up
drop down (the vertical lines)
parallel lines
perpendicular lines
reflection on line of symmetry
transformation
project the information round
transfers the sizes
and warehouse workers in terms of 'kind',
'size' and 'location'. Each of the groups of
dairy workers had their thinking organised by
the kinds of activity they engaged in. But their
knowledge also guided action. When
warehouse workers made up an order from an
order form, they would group the items on the
list to be brought for central loading in ways
that reduced journey distance. They used the
accumulated social knowledge that went into
the layout of the warehouse and individual
knowledge that reflected the current stacking
arrangement. Observations showed that they
would take very efficient travel paths in terms
of distance, and would group items on the
order form in ways that aided this efficiency.
Looking at this from the point of view of
learning (i.e. to be a dairy worker), Scribner
(1985) concludes that "What you learn is
bound up with what you have to do." (p. 203)
This explains the situation the girl predicting
the circuit operation with a bulb-holder; the
activities and artefacts she worked with in
science lessons determined what she learned
about how circuits work. If she moved to
technology lessons the different activities and
artefacts would require different knowledge.
In cognitive psychology, those who deal with
'real-world' tasks see knowledge as the
'knowledge of devices or systems' (Gott,
1988). In the area of 'real-world' tasks it is
this 'device knowledge' that makes fault
finding, for example, successful. The nature
of such device knowledge may reflect as
much the context of the device (e.g. its
operation) as any abstract knowledge taught in
science. For technologists this is important,
not just because they deal with devices and
systems (designing, making and repairing
them), but because their conceptual
knowledge will be linked to these devices and
systems, rather than to abstract concepts,
typical of science. (Just as was the case for
the girl learning about circuits in science.)
The way knowledge is viewed (indeed what
counts as knowledge) is determined by the
actions associated with it. Thus rather than
seeing an electronic circuit in terms of a
differential equation (a mathematical
abstraction), engineers often see it in terms of
Nyquist diagrams that reflect the effect of the
components on the operation of the circuit
(Bissell and Dillon, 1991). This is their
'device' knowledge that contrasts with
mathematical knowledge. It also turns out
that, as the complexity of devices increases,
so does the importance of the interaction of
device knowledge and procedural knowledge
(Gott, 1988, p. 120). Again, it is 'device'
knowledge, not the conceptual abstractions of
mathematics or science.
Taking stock so far, I have drawn attention to
the importance of procedural knowledge, and
its link with device knowledge. This latter
knowledge stems from the fact that useful
knowledge is embedded in objects, and
related to action. This is the kind of
knowledge that experts use in their problem
solving.
The qualitative nature of expert
knowledge6
It is already well understood in the field of
problem solving, for example in physics, that
experts always start to work on problems by
thinking about them in qualitative terms
(Glaser, 1984). This stands in stark contrast to
the way we start novices off on learning how
to do such problem solving; invariably with
the figures and equations, working without
much overall understanding of what they are
doing. Chris Dillon, in his account of
qualitative approaches used by experts,
characterises them by the degree to which
they reflect the device (that is to be controlled
or understood) on the one hand, in contrast to
the mathematics (or science) model that could
be used to represent the device's operation, on
the other (Dillon, 1994). This in part reflects
the device knowledge indicated earlier and in
part the fact that in a practical situation the
science cannot cope with the complexity
involved.
Let me illustrate the kind of complexity where
qualitative approaches are useful, and do this
in the context of a simple mechanism. As part
of our research into problem solving in design
and technology lessons at Key Stage 3, we
observed two 12-year-old girls working on a
mechanism that was used to collect money for
charity. The mechanism contains a number of
components (Figure 7): a falling coin
channelled (A) to hit a balanced beam (B)
with an integral pendulum (C), with an off-set
pivot (D) connected to a bird shape on the
other side (E), that would rock to peck a tree
trunk (F). There is an operational principle of
the overall mechanism, which the pupils have
to understand. Each of the components (e.g.
the force exerted by the falling coin, the
pendulum swing) could be understood with
science, and made to operate successfully. For
example, varying the distance of fall of the
coin to allow enough momentum to be gained
so that even a small coin would cause rocking;
balancing the beam horizontally by altering
the off-set pivot and counterweight, such that
the beam would move on impact. Now the
scicnce of this is well beyond children of this
age, and it would be likely that even a
professional engineer would be hard pushed to
put down all the quantitative science and
mathematics to represent the operation of
such a system as a whole. Of course it
wouldn't be worth it! Any engineer would use
qualitative reasoning to ensure a working
mechanism. There would be some
experimenting with the size of coins on
simple beams to determine the amount of fall
necessary, and similarly with the counter
weight on the beam (the beam size is a
function of the overall size of the money box),
and so on. It might look like trial and error,
but in fact it would be qualitative reasoning
supported by a knowledge of science.
However, it would be a level of science at a
much simpler level than required for the full
explanation of the operation of individual
components. The reasoning is a combination
of procedural knowledge and device
knowledge, which seeks to explain how the
initial fall of the coin works its way through
the mechanism to end up in the desired effect
of the bird pecking the tree.
Thc qualitative reasoning is not just a feature
of the wayan engineer might work, but also
of the two girls and their teacher. In our
classroom research of this project we recorded
their reasoning at three points. The first is at
the beginning of the project when the pupils
go to the teacher with their idea of a
woodpecker that pecks a tree when money is
put in the box. The teacher illustrates the
rocking movement with his hand. As he does
this he says "Transmit movement (from lever7
to bird) to the front...", and then tells the
pupils that they must lock the pivot to the
lever "to make sure it runs ... (with the
lever)". Neither of these statements draws on
much conventional science and the wording is
close to the physical nature of the mechanism.
The second point we observed was when, later
in the first lesson, the pupi Is started to model
the mechanism in card, working from an
example mechanism of a rocking boat. The
girls try to decide on the positions of the
components, including the bird, based on how
much the beam moves for different sized
coins. At first one girl tries to locate the bird
(cut out as a separate piece) relative to the tree
trunk that she is trying to draw on the front
cover sheet. She starts with the bird in its
normal upright position and then rocks it,
saying: "It'll be in that position first of all,
then it's going to go knock, knock." (The
"knock" is the sound of the bird pecking the
tree.) She then moves to the example
mechanism and reasons about how it operates
with different sized coins:
P: It depends how much money they put
in, because if it's a SOp, it's going to go







P: Then if it's a Sp ... it will still move ...
but only a little bit. ..
The girl is using language that reflects the
object ("dong" the sound a big coin makes),
and it is qualitative in the way it describes the






In the second week of the project, when they
were making the actual mechanism the pupils
went to the teacher for help and he said they
had to balance the beam. This was done with
BluTack as the counterweight on the left-hand
end of the beam (Figure 7). He used phrases
such as:
Balance that (lever) up with a bit of
BluTack ... stick another bit on it. ..
The further over you get it (BluTack) ...
some more leverage ... it's beginning to
balance now.
There are some scientific ideas involved, but
it is very qualitative, with language close to
the operation of the mechanism.
Such qualitative reasoning could be improved
if it was the focus of the learning. In the end
the pupils are working out the effect of
dropping different sized coins, and the way
that effect works its way through the
mechanism. The teacher could encourage the
pupils to follow his reasoning, and to explain
to him the effect of dropping coins. The
science that they used could be related to how
certain effects can be changed (e.g. to
increase 'sensitivity' of the beam to small
coins), so that pupils could predict the likely
effects of changes. This reflects the approach
of the 'causal accounts' that Dillon (1994)
describes as one kind of 'qualitative
reasoning' that is being formalised as a way
of dealing with complex situations. He also
notes that these are the kinds of explanations
of electronic circuits found in undergraduate
texts, and our researches on design and
technology have indicated similar teacher
explanations for circuits in secondary schools
(Levinson, Murphy and McCormick, 1997;
McCormick and Murphy, 1994). If such
qualitative reasoning is so much a feature of
technological thinking and action, then we
should make sure that we try to develop
pupils' abilities to use it.
The usual way in which we think about
explaining devices and systems, such as
mechanisms or electric circuits, is to use
knowledge from science. There are a number
of assumptions that underlie this. The first is
that the science does indeed explain the
devices. Layton (1993) has reminded us of
Polanyi's idea of the operational pricniple,
which according to Polanyi, determines how
components in, say a machine, fulfil their
functions and combine in an overall operation
that achieves the function of the machine
(Polanyi, 1962, p. 328). Layton contrasts this
operational principle, as technological
knowledge, with that of science; science he
argues cannot contrive such a principle, but
can explain the success and failure of it, and
lead to improvement of it. This then sees
science and mathematics in a supportive role,
not a determining role, and the idea of
technology as the "appliance of science", as
Zanussi uses in its advertisements, is a
misrepresentation of the situation. This is
evident in the case of the mechanism of the
money-box.
Capability Found?
My argument has had a number of strands to
get me to the point of seeing a role for
qualitative knowledge within capability. First,
I have tried to illustrate that early models of
capability were based upon processes. This
focus put knowledge to one side, and, I argue,
also characterised the process (design or
problem solving) in ways that did not do
justice to its use in practice (by learners or
experts). Expert problem solving, for
example, is based on rich knowledge of the
context and the substance of the problem and
its solution. Although it has a strong
procedural element, it is not simply
procedural. Where (conceptual) knowledge is
assumed to be relevant (e.g. the use of science
or mathematics), insufficient attention is paid
to the nature of that knowledge. The context
within which knowledge is learned and used
has a profound impact on how it is conceived
by individuals (learners and experts).
Knowledge that is used by experts is not only
tied to the context (device knowledge), but it
is qualitative in nature. This links the
conceptual knowledge to the procedural
knowledge. Indeed, the division of the two
becomes less significant, as causal
explanations are essentially procedural and yet
indicate relationships that are typical of
conceptual knowledge. As procedural
knowledge is the substance of processes such
as problem solving and design, these
processes cannot be seen in isolation from
conceptual knowledge.
Thus we arrive at the situation where we must
consider processes (procedural knowledge) as
intimately linked with conceptual knowledge,
and that also this conceptual knowledge is
related to the objects in technology (e.g. the
tools and devices); hence the use of the term
'device knowledge'. Qualitative knowledge,
and with it qualitative reasoning about the
devices in technology, are central to this view
of knowledge. Qualitative knowledge is linked
to action of all kinds, whether that be
designing or solving problems.
I have argued for the importance of qualitative
knowledge and the reasoning associated with
it. Given this importance, we must teach this
kind of knowledge, and ensure a greater role
for it in teaching pupils to act technologically.
Some of this teaching will be through pupils
being helped in trying to understand devices
(products and applications). When pupils are
investigating or dismantling products they can
develop ways of reasoning about the operation
of these products. Some of this can be done
through the more usual design-and-make
activities, where making modifications to, or
trying to establish new products, will give
opportunities for reasoning, in the way the
two girls did with their money-box. But to be
true to my earlier concerns, we still have as
much to do to investigate what teachers and
pupils currently do with regard to this kind of
knowledge. Any experienced teacher will
reason qualitatively quite naturally, and all
they need to do is to make this more explicit,
and to support pupils in developing this kind
of reasoning. In some ways this "may come
more easily to them than the design processes
that they are required to teach, especially
where they are not expert practitioners of
design themselves. We still have much to do
in understanding how we teach design and
problem solving, and how qualitative
reasoning links with these processes.
The way those involved in design and
technology have refined their views on
processes, albeit slowly, now needs to be
developed to incorporate those of knowledge.
My exploration of this kind of knowledge has
sought to suggest that we should not look in
the first instance to the abstraction of science
and mathematics, but to the practical
knowledge used by technologists. This search
does not imply a swing from 'process' to
'knowledge', but the search for the
relationship of the two. Nor does this imply
that science and mathematics are to be
ignored, but that their role in the design and
technology lesson may be more complex than
assumed. For me this route would lead to the
finding of that 'paradise', if that is indeed
what it is.
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Notes
1. In particular I will draw on work funded by
the ESRC (Grant number R00023445
Problem solving in technology education: a
case of situated learning?), the Design
Council (Mathematics by Design), and the
Open University. I would like to acknowledge
the work of Patricia Murphy, Marian
Davidson and Hilary Evens, all of whom
have contributed to the research, thinking
and writing that formed the basis of this
lecture. I would also like to acknolwedge the
help of Frank Banks, Gwyneth Owen-
Jackson, and Frank Whiteman, all of who
commented on an earlier draft.
2. Ofsted reports have highlighted the way
lessons often leave pupils with no real
decision making or creativity (e.g. Ofsted,
1995, p. 11).
3. When Murphy et al (1995) reviewed the field
they found relatively few, more recent
studies have improved the situation
(Doornekamp and Streumer, 1996; Kimbell,
Stables and Green, 1996; Mioduser, 1998;
Murphy and McCormick, 1997; Roden, 1997;
Welch and Lim, 1998).
4. Sicence education has gone through a
similar realisation from the early days of
process science, to the current position
where 'process' is associated with particular
conceptual areas. See Murphy and
McCormick (1997) for a comparison of
sicence and tchnology with regard to
process.
5. 'Knowledge' used in this general way refers
to 'factual and conceptual knowledge',
although, as it will become clear, even these
categories are insufficient to explain the
situation.
6. A version of this sub-section is published in
McCormick (1999).
7. The teacher refers to the 'beam' as a 'lever',
reflecting the kind of science terms with
which the pupils would have been familiar.
